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REGULATION OF COMPETITION IN THE CANADA/U.S.
CONTEXT - EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF U.S.
ANTITRUST LAW - A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE
CrystalL. Witterick
I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, the enforcement of Canadian competition law
has taken on an increasingly international dimension in response to the internationalization of commerce.
A former Director of Investigation and Research noted that:
[G]lobalization ... heightened pressures for international convergence and expanded international cooperation in antitrust enforcement. It has accelerated the internationalization of competition policy
It is now being recognized that effective antitrust enforcement in today's
global economy is dependent on three factors:
(i) the "extraterritorial" application of a country's laws (i.e. their application to conduct occurring wholly or partly outside that country
where such conduct is having anticompetitive effects in that country);
(ii) cooperation among antitrust agencies in the enforcement of their
laws; and

* Crystal Witterick is a partner in the law firm of Davies, Ward & Beck in Toronto,
Ontario.
I George N. Addy, The Canadian Competition Act as a Model of Flexible ForwardLooking Competition Law, Address to Conference on the Promotion of Competitiveness in
Monterrey, Neuvo Leon, Mexico, Oct. 5, 1997, at 8.
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(iii) the adoption of principles on positive comity to avoid disputes
arisng from a country's extraterritorial application of its antitrust
laws.3
In the recent Nippon Paper case, the U.S. Court of Appeals explained
the necessity of such an approach as follows:
We live in an age of international commerce, where decisions
reached in one comer of the globe can reverberate around the globe
in less time than it takes to tell the tale. Thus, a ruling in [Nippon's]
favour would create perverse incentives for those who would use nefarious means to influence markets in the United States, rewarding
them for erecting as many territorial firewalls as possible between
cause and effect.
The United States has been very aggressive in its approach regarding the
extraterritorial application of competition laws compared to Canada. Canadians have historically been anxious about the "long arm" approach of U.S.
antitrust enforcement, both public and private. The Canadian government has
historically taken steps to protect Canadian citizens from attempts by the
U.S. government, courts, and people to compel the production of evidence in
antitrust proceedings and other litigation.
In the context of increasing cooperation between competition authorities
and the recognition that antitrust laws must adapt to business in global markets, there is evidence of a Canadian shift from a territorial approach to jurisdiction to the use of a U.S.-style "effects doctrine.",4 In this climate, the recognition of positive comity obligations is necessary to facilitate enforcement
efforts and reduce the frictions which inevitably arise when two or more
countries assert jurisdiction over the same transaction or conduct. However,
positive comity does not address the impediments to "international" enforcement. The need for law enforcement to keep up with the integration of
markets has fostered the development of a very close cooperative relation2

Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millenium: InternationalAntitrust Enforcement at the

End of the Twentieth Century, Address at Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Oct. 6, 1997)
(transcript available from U.S. Dep't of Justice Antitrust Division).
3 United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 944 F. Sup,.55 (D. Mass. 1996), rev'd
109
F.3d (st Cir. 1997).
4 For a further discussion of the law and developments in this area, see C. Goldman et
al., INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND THE CANADIAN COMPETITION ACT,(B. Hawk ed., Fordham
Corp. L. Inst., Transnational Juris Publications, Inc. (1992)) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
MERGERS]. For a Canadian perspective on the recent extension of the exraterritorial reach of
U.S. antitrust laws, see P. Cramption, The 1995 U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelinesfor
InternationalOperations:A ForeignPerspective,INT'L Bus. L.J. 99 (1996).
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ship between Canada and the United States. This trend to greater cooperation
creates new legal and practical issues for businesses with operations in both
countries. Among these concerns are the treatment of confidential information gathered in one country that is (or might be) provided to the other and,
within that context, the ability of authorities in one country to use a firm's
computer system to access and seize information in the other country.
These remarks review Canada's position on the extraterritorial assertion
of jurisdiction, outline the framework for cooperation among Canadian and

U.S. antitrust authorities, discuss Canada's response to U.S. attempts to claim
jurisdiction over Canadian actors, and briefly identify current issues arising
out of the increasing cooperation between Canadian and U.S. antitrust
authorities in response to cross-border anticompetitive conduct.
II. EFFECTS-BASED JURISDICrION - THE CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

U.S. courts and enforcement authorities have asserted antitrust jurisdiction with respect to conduct which has a substantial and foreseeable effect on
5
U.S. commerce, regardless of where the impugned conduct occurs. The government of Canada and Canadian courts have historically taken a more restrictive approach to the extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction, applying a
more limited effects-based jurisdiction test, circumscribed by principles of
international comity.
In the leading Canadian decision in this regard, Libman v. The Queen,6
the Supreme Court of Canada defined the limits of territoriality on the basis
of whether a significant portion of the activities which constituted the offence
took place in Canada.7 The need for a real and substantial link between the.
offence and Canada was identified as the basis for the assertion of jurisdiction. However, the Court imposed the requirement of compliance with the
principles of international comity, meaning that if the assertion of jurisdiction
5 This principle was first established in Aluminum Company of America v. United

States, 148 F.2d (416) (2d Cir., 1945), and expanded upon in the Nippon Paper case. Id. See
also the revised International Operations Enforcement Guidelines jointly issued by the U.S.
-Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
6 2 S.C.R. 178 (1985), at 212-13.
7 There are two aspects to any jurisdictional question - in the language of international
law, the first aspect is referred to as prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction, and the second is
referred to as enforcement jurisdiction. The discussion in this Article focuses on prescriptive
jurisdiction. Prescriptive jurisdiction is the question of whether Canada has the ability to
prescribe a certain rule of law that reaches the subject matter at issue. Enforcement jurisdiction
is the question of whether the Canadian courts and tribunals have the ability to enforce that
law against a particular person. In other words, in addition to possessing prescriptive
jurisdiction over the subject matter, a state also needs jurisdiction over the person in order to
enforce its laws.
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by one country would conflict with the laws of another country, then the
court should decline to assert jurisdiction
A similarly circumscribed position was taken in the amicus brief filed by
the Canadian government in the HartfordFire case,8 a case in which the U.S.
Supreme Court considered the appropriate limits on the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. In its brief, the Canadian government argued that
customary international law enjoins a state from applying its economic law to
regulate the conduct of persons located in a foreign territory where doing so
directly conflicts with the laws of the foreign territorial sovereign.
In addition to the limits established by Canadian courts on the assertion9
of effects-based jurisdiction, the criminal provisions in the Competition Act
must be interpreted in the context of subsection 6(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code.10 Subsection 6(2) provides that subject to the Code or any other
Act of Parliament, "no person shall be convicted ...
of an offence committed
outside Canada." However, there are a number of provisions in the Competition Act which support the assertion of jurisdiction where foreign conduct is
having an anticompetitive effect. For example, under section 46 of the Competition Act, it is a criminal offence if a corporation carrying on business in
Canada implements a foreign conspiracy or agreement that, if entered into in
Canada, would contravene the conspiracy provisions in section 45. Although
there were no contested proceedings on the issue of jurisdiction, in June
1993, Chemagro Ltd. was convicted and fined $1.25 million in respect of a
foreign-directed conspiracy to lessen competition unduly in the sale of
chemical insecticides.
The inclusion of section 46 in the Competition Act does not necessarily
preclude the application of section 45 to an illegal agreement entered into
outside Canada. Section 45 itself contains no express territorial restriction. In
fact, this section was recently used to convict, on guilty pleas, a U.S. company and a Japanese company which, according to the Director, had entered
into an agreement outside Canada which the Director alleged2 threatened to
lessen competition for the sale of thermal fax paper in Canada.1
On May 27, 1998, Archer Daniels Midland Company pleaded guilty to
having participated in price fixing and market sharing conspiracies, contrary
to section 45 of the Competition Act. According to the Competition Bureau's
8 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
9 CompetitionAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, as amended.
10 CriminalCode, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

1 Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, Chemagro Fined a Record $2 Million
for
Conspiracy Under the CompetitionAct, News Release NR-1 1228/93-18 (June 14, 1993).
12 Competition Bureau, Mitsubishi PaperMills, Ltd. Pleads Guilty Under the Competition
Act and Pays $850,000 Fine in the Thermal Fax PaperInquiry, News Release (Feb. 28, 1997).
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News Release, 13 the "offences relate to the participation of the firm in an
international conspiracy to fix prices and allocate market shares in the lysine
and citric acid markets worldwide." The Agreed Statement of Facts states
that the relevant "conversations and meeting [giving rise to the unlawful
agreement] occurred in locations outside Canada."
The price maintenance provisions in section 61, which make it an offence
to attempt to unilaterally increase the price at which another person supplies
a product, were used to convict, based on guilty pleas, Mitsubishi Corporation of Tokyo, Japan and Mitsubishi Canada Ltd. for their direct or indirect
paper to a Canadian business because of its
refusals to supply thermal fax
14
Canada.
in
policy
low pricing
This strict approach to the extraterritorial application of laws also extends
outward to protect Canada's sovereignty. In commenting on the 1949 Canadian Radio Patents case,' 5 the Canadian Minister of Justice expressed the
view that a U.S. decree requiring directors of Canadian companies to take
actions dictated by U.S. law which would not be dictated or in accord with
"could only be regarded as an infringement of
Canadian business policy,
16
Canadian sovereignty."'
In the past, Canada has adopted a number of measures in order to block
attempts by foreign persons to compel testimony from persons or the production of documents located in Canada for the purpose of foreign proceedings. For example, U.S. plaintiffs and U.S. authorities in antitrust matters
have historically had difficulty in enforcing letters rogatory in Canada (letters
rogatory are documents requesting Canadian production of information and
testimony for the purpose of U.S. proceedings). 17 In a 1977 case, an Ontario
court denied an application brought by Westinghouse, a U.S. company, for
the enforcement of letters rogatory issued by a U.S. court, which sought production of documents in Canada (including documents in the possession of
13 Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Will Request a Tribunal Consent Orderwith

Respect to ADM"s Acquisition of FlourMillsfrom Maple Leaf Mills Inc., News Release (Feb.

28, 1997).

14 Bureau of Competition Policy, SecondFine Levied Under the Competition Act in Joint

Canada-U.S.Investigation,News Release 11546/194-18 (Aug. 5, 1994).
15 United States v. General Electric Company, 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.NJ. 1949). For a
detailed discussion of this case, see Competition Law of Canada, § 13.03[1]-25.
16 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 1, at 618 (1959).
17 The Canada Evidence Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 46) and similar provincial legislation
grant Canadian courts jurisdiction to enforce letters rogatory. However, Canadian courts have
interpreted these laws to authorize compliance with letters rogatory only if the material is
required for the purpose of trial (not discovery), enforcement is necessary for the purpose of
justice, and the effect of enforcement is not contrary to public policy. See Raychem Corp. v.
Canusa Coating Systems, Inc., [1971] 1 O.R. 192 at 197 (C.A.); McCarthy v. Mentin, [1963] 2
O.R. 154 (C.A.); Adams v. Adams, [1970] 3 All E.R. 572 (P.D.A.).
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• 18
private parties, the Canadian government, and Crown corporations).
The
letters were issued in the course of antitrust proceedings brought by sixteen
American companies against Westinghouse, alleging that Westinghouse
failed to fulfill its obligations under certain uranium supply contracts, and an
investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division into alleged price fixing. Westinghouse pleaded in defense that because a cartel of
foreign governments (including Canada) and uranium producers conspired to
artificially increase the prices of uranium, it was commercially unreasonable
for Westinghouse to fulfill its obligations under those contracts. The evidence sought by Westinghouse was critical to its defense as well as a civil
action brought by it against a group of uranium producers. The Canadian
government opposed Westinghouse's application. It enacted regulations prohibiting the production of the documents or the giving of testimony relating
to any aspect of the uranium business unless required to do so by a law of
Canada or the Federal Government, and introduced an affidavit by Canada's
then-Minister of Energy to the effect that producing the documents would be
contrary to Canadian public policy. The Supreme Court of Ontario refused to
enforce the letters rogatory, partly on grounds that enforcement of letters
rogatory is founded on international comity and that comity cannot be exercised in violation of the public policy of the country to whom an appeal for
assistance is made. 9 The Government's position on the issue of public policy
was clear from the regulations and the Minister's affidavit.
Gulf Oil, a respondent in Westinghouse's civil action, also brought an
application to have the letters rogatory enforced in Canada because it needed
the information for its defense. The Supreme Court of Canada declined,
again for public policy reason, to compel the production of documents or
force testimony. 2The Court stated that it was applying the rules of private
international law at the request of the Canadian government to exclude the
extraterritorial
enforcement of a foreign law in violation of Canadian sover21
eignty.
The uranium cases are not the first instance where the Canadian government has sought to stop the reach of U.S. antitrust laws. Following an attempt in 1947 by the U.S. government to obtain production of documents in
the possession of Canadian International Paper Company,22 a subsidiary of a
18 In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. and Duquesne Light
Co.. (1977), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 3,
31, C.P.R. (2d) 164 sub nom. In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation,
16 O.R.
(2d) 273.
19 ld. at 291.
20 Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gulf Canada Limited et al., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 39.

Id. at 61-62.
n In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian Intemational Paper
Company, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
21
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U.S. company, two provinces and the Federal Government enacted legislation, referred to as "blocking" legislation, prohibiting the production of
documents at the request of a foreign country where it is contrary to public
policy?23 In addition, sections 82 and 83 of the Competition Act allow the
Canadian Competition Tribunal to prohibit the production of documents in
U.S. or other foreign proceedings. Grounds for making such an order include
where compliance would adversely affect competition, foreign trade of Canada, or commerce generally. Although these provisions have never been applied, their potential application is very broad. Concerns over the scope of
jurisdiction and international comity principles also impact on the granting of
anti-suit injunctions, extradition requests, and enforcement of foreign
awards.24
H. A SEA OF CHANGE

Growing acceptance of effects-based jurisdiction and the practical realities of antitrust enforcement in global markets has led to a broadening of the
historical Canadian a Vproach to the extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction.
In the Controni case, which involved proceeding to extradite a Canadian
citizen to the United States to face drug trafficking charges, Supreme Court
Justice La Forest stated:
It would be a sad commentary on our law if it was limited to the
prosecution of minor offenders while permitting more seasoned
criminals to operate on a worldwide scale.
What is more, I do not think that the free and democratic society that
is Canada should confine itself to parochial and nationalistic concepts of community. 26

The Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA), S.C. 1984, c. 49; Business Records
Protection Act (Ontario), R.S.O. c. B-19; and Business Concerns Record Act (Quebec), R.S.Q.

c. D-12. For a further discussion of blocking legislation, see

COMPETMON LAW OF CANADA,

§§ 5.07, 13.02 (C. Goldman & J. Bodrug eds., Juris Publishing, Inc.).
24 For example, section 8 of FEMA provides that, if the Attorney General of
Canada
detenmines that a judgment issued by a foreign tribunal under an antitrust law has or will
adversely affect Canadian sovereignty, the Attorney General may order that judgment not be
recognized or reduce the monetary amount of the judgment. For a detailed discussion of these
issues, see COMPETrrON LAW OF CANADA, § 13.04 [4], [5], [6] (C. Goldman & . Bodrug eds.,
Juris Publishing, Inc.).
2 United States of America v. Controni (1989), 48
C.C.C. (3d) 193.

26

Id., at 56.
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Further, as a result of the greater cooperation among antitrust authorities
in the face of globalization, Canadian courts may be more understanding of
the need to facilitate foreign enforcement efforts and more willing to regard
granting enforcement assistance as consistent with Canadian public policy.
For example, an Ontario court recently granted an application to enforce
letters rogatory that had been issued by a Florida court. The Court found that
there was no way that the proceeding could proceed without assistance from
Canada. The Court did not find any violation of public policy or comity principles in enforcing the letters rogatory.
The use of effects-based jurisdiction is also supported by both the actions
and public comments of the current and previous Directors. In a 1991 speech,
former Director George Addy recognized that the practical implications of
globalization may require the exercise of jurisdiction over conduct outside a
state's borders:
The phenomenon of increasing internationalization of business and
commerce has been accompanied by equal efforts on the part of
states to assert their authority over transnational economic activity.
In these circumstances, there have been attempts to extend jurisdiction beyond national borders ....
Yet some extraterritorial reach may be essential in order to avoid allowing the transnational character of a business practice to remove it
from the ambit of a state's law. For example, few would argue that a
private conspiracy to raise prices in a national market should escape
discipline simply because it was entered
into beyond a state's bor2
ders but implemented on its territory. 8
In the Director's News Release 29 regarding the conviction of a U.S. citizen and company under the criminal misleading advertising provisions in the
Competition Act (in the course of which extradition proceedings were commenced to encourage the U.S. individual to plead guilty) the Director stated:
This case is the first in which international agreements have been
used to cause an American corporation and individual to attend a
Somerset Pharmacuticals, Inc. v. Interpharm, Inc. (1994), 52 C.P.R. (3d) 317 (Ont.
Gen. Div.).
27

28 George N. Addy, International Coordination of Competition Policies, paper delivered

to the HWWA - Institut fu-r Wirtschaftsborschung - Hamburg, Germany, Oct. 9-11, 1991, at
11-12.

Bureau of Competition Policy, Thomas Liquidation, Inc. Fined $130,000 for One
Count of MisleadingAdvertising Under the CompetitionAct, News Release (Feb. 7, 1995).
29
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Canadian criminal court and answer charges under the Competition
Act. It should send a message to advertisers that Canada will not
hesitate to use the extradition process to enforce the Act. The action
taken in this case is in line with the Bureau's commitment to international cooperation in detecting and fighting unfair and deceptive
30
marketing practices.
The Director has also sought remedial relief against a U.S. corporation
for conduct occurring outside Canada. In the Chrysler case,3 ' the Competition Tribunal ordered Chrysler Canada Ltd. to supply the complainant auto
parts exporter under section 75, the refusal to deal provision, of the Competition Act. Subsequently, the Director filed a motion seeking the issuance of
an order requiring not only Chrysler Canada Ltd. but also its U.S. parent corporation to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of the Competition Tribunal's order. The Director alleged that Chrysler U.S. and its officer refused to fill certain of the complainant's orders in an attempt to persuade the complainant to encourage the Director to compromise certain appeals relating to the Competition Tribunals' original decision.
There are other examples of the assertion of effects-based jurisdiction by
the Director. With respect to mergers, the Director has interpreted the premerger notification provisions in sections 109 and 110 of the Competition
Act to require prenotification where the merger is between two foreign companies with subsidiaries in Canada. The Director has also sought review of
mergers between foreign companies with Canadian subsidiaries. 32 For example, the Director asserted jurisdiction to review the proposed takeover in
1991 by Schneider of Square D even though the takeover was by an American company of an American company, because there were potential effects
on competition in Canada. Schneider ultimately agreed to a hold-separate
undertaking, even after the U.S. antitrust agency passed on the merger. 33 The
implications of the assertion of effects-based jurisdiction is that it often results in more than one country asserting jurisdiction over an international
transaction, which inevitably leads to disputes.

30

1.

Id.

31

Director of Investigation and Research v. Chrysler Canada Ltd. (1989), 27 C.P.R. (3d)

32

See hTERNATONAL

MERGERS,

supra note 4 (discussing the Competition Bureau's

practice of reviewing mergers occurring outside Canada on the basis of the effects of the

merger in Canada).
33 Following completion of his review, the Director concluded that the merger would not
unduly affect competition in Canada.
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IV. PosrrivE COMITY
Positive comity helps to minimize frictions between states that have concurrent jurisdiction over a particular matter.3 4 It respects the sovereignty of
participating countries by recognizing that the country whose market is most
immediately affected has a principal responsibility for enforcement. 35
The Canadian amicus brief in Hartford Fire stated that Canadian courts
do not generally apply Canadian law where to do so would displace or undermine the laws or established policies of another state.36 However, positive
comity does not alleviate the enforcement problems which arise in the context of cross-border transactions. Positive comity does not contemplate any
convergence in laws or enforcement approach, and does not by itself permit
the exchange of confidential documents and testimony. The uranium cases
illustrate the practical difficulties which may arise where one country either
fails to support or opposes the extraterritorial application of a foreign state's
antitrust laws to nationals of the first country. In this regard, Joel Klein has
noted that one serious problem facing international antitrust enforcement is
the inability to obtain crucial evidence located outside the enforcer's jurisdiction, the possible lack of personal jurisdiction, and the risk of arousing
foreign sovereignty concerns. He suggests that cooperation and coordination
between and among national antitrust authorities can help in managing this
problem.37
V. COOPERATION AMONG ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES

One of the challenges faced by an antitrust authority that seeks to apply
laws on an extraterritorial basis is the ability to get the information it needs to
proceed and then to enforce whatever penalties it chooses to impose. The
34 The concept of positive comity developed from a 1967 Council Recommendation of
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on Cooperation
Between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade.
In 1986, the OECD passed a recommendation encouraging Member Countries to notify other
Members of domestic investigations or proceedings with respect to restrictive business
practices that may affect important interests of other Member Countries (OECD document
C(86) 44 (final) June 5, 1986).
35 Positive comity obligations are included in the 1995 Agreement Between the
Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Regarding the
Application of their Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws (the 1995

Agreement).

See supranote 8, at 7.
I. Klein, The Internationaliztion of Antitrust: Bilateral and Multilateral
Responses, Address at the European University Institute Conference on Competition,
Florence, Italy (June 13, 1997) (transcript available from U.S. Dep't of Justice Antitrust
Division).
37 See Joel
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current Director of the Competition Bureau, Konrad von Finckenstein, has
recently described international cooperation as a necessary response to markets without borders. 38 In recognition that it takes a multinational effort to
address multinational conduct, there is now extensive cooperation and information sharing among antitrust agencies, particularly between Canada and
the United States. In 1996, the last year for which statistics are available, the
Bureau received thirty-eight notifications from foreign competition authorities, seventy-four percent of which were from the United States. At the same
time, seventy percent of the notifications sent by the Competition Bureau to
foreign authorities were sent to the United States. 39 From the U.S. perspective, Joel Klein has commented that the relationship with Canada should be a
model for bilateral arrangements with other countries.4
and information
Steps recently taken to increase the extent of cooperation
41
sharing between Canada and the United States include:
"

the establishment of the U.S. International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to advise the U.S. Attorney General on international

antitrust issues; 42
"

the signing on August 3, 1995 of an agreement between Canada and the
United States regarding the application of their competition and
deceptive marketing practices laws (the 1995 Agreement); 43

38 See 73 ANTITRuSTTRAD E&REG. REP. 216.
39 International Cooperationin the Enforcement of Competition Laws, Recent CanadaUnited States CriminalExperience, paper presented by Martin Low, Senior General Counsel,
Competiton & Consumer Law Division, Canadian Bar Association 1997 Annual Competition
Law Conference, Aylmer, Quebec (Sept. 19, 1997). Such notifications may be in respect of
conduct in one country that may be of interest to enforcement authorities in the other, or a
prelude to a request for information and/or information exchanges between the two countries.
40 See Joel . Klein, CriminalEnforcement in a Globalized Economy, Speech presented at
the Advanced Criminal Workshop, Phoenix, Arizona, Feb. 20, 1997, at 5-6.
41 For a more detailed discussion of these arrangements and their implications, see C.S.
Goldman, Q.C. & J.T. Kissack, Current Issues in Cross-Border Criminal Investigations: A
CanadianPerspective,Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Twenty-Second Annual Conference,
International Antitrust Law & Policy, Oct. 26-27, 1995.
42 In the Department of Justice Press Release announcing the establishment of the
Committee, Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein remarked that, "the changing competitive
realities have resulted in new challenges for enforcement of our antitrust laws. Cooperation
and coordination among international antitrust enforcers is more crucial than ever." Reno,
Klein Unveil First-ever Committee To Attack Anticompetitive Cartels, Dep't. of Justice Press
Release, Monday, Nov. 24, 1997.
43 See supra note 35. The 1995 Agreement is much more extensive and important than the
1984 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that it supersedes. First, it is a binding
agreement - the MOU was not. Second, much greater detail is provided with respect to the
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the issuance in June 1995 by the Canadian government of a Discussion
Paper 44 concerning proposals to amend the Act, among other things to
permit greater cooperation and information sharing between Canadian
and foreign antitrust agencies;

" the passage of the U.S. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance
Act;
*

the extension in 1991 of the Extradition Treaty between Canada and the
United States to offences punishable by the laws of both countries by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or greater (which includes
antitrust offences); 45 and

" the signing, on March 18, 1985, of the Treaty between the Government
of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLAT), which came into
force January 14, 1990.*4 Examples of assistance include exchanging
information, providing documents and records, and executing searches
and obtaining testimony.
In addition to formal procedures for cooperation and information exchange, competition authorities also engage in informal information contacts
to discuss common issues. 47
There are several examples of successful cooperative enforcement efforts
between Canada and the United States. In early 1994, the United States announced that Polar Plastics Mfg. Ltd., Plastics, Inc., Comet Products Inc.,
and a number of individuals had been charged following a U.S. investigation
in which Canadian authorities, pursuant to a U.S. request for assistance under
the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, raided the Canadian offices of one of the
firms. A number of executives, including a Canadian, went to jail in connecextent of coordination between the two governments and, for the first time, comity
considerations are included to assist in avoiding conflicts in investigations.
4 Industry Canada, Competition Act Amendments (Discussion Paper, June 1995).
45 Treaty of Extradition, Mar. 22, 1976, United States-Canada, 1976 Can. T.S., No.
3 (as
amended by an exchange of Notes on June 28 and July 29, 1974 and a Protocol dated Jan. 11,
1988).
1990 Can. T.S, No. 19.
47 See George Addy, Address to the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust
Law,
Chicago (Aug. 6, 1995), at 2. See also J.F. Rill & V.R. Metallo, Trans-BorderEnforcement of
Competition Law: A Perspectivefrom the UnitedStates, Paper prepared for presentation to the
1995 Annual Competition Law Conference of the Canadian Bar Association National
Competition Law Section (Sept. 1995), at 25.
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tion with the resulting U.S. prosecutions.48 Also in 1994, Mitsubishi Corporation, Kanzaki Specialty Papers Inc., and Mitsubishi International Corporation were convicted in what was described as the first joint prosecution involving the 49United States and Canada following extensive cooperation under
the MLAT.
In late 1995, officials in both Canada and the United States once again
highlighted information sharing and cooperation between them in the ductile
pipe case, in which a Canadian firm was convicted of market allocation with
a U.S. firm.'
VI. SOME CURRENT ISSUES
The trend to greater cooperation creates new legal and practical issues for
businesses with operations in more than one country.
A. Protection of Confidential Information
There have been growing concerns on the part of businesses about the
scope of information-sharing activities among antitrust agencies and preserving the confidentiality of sensitive business information. Section 29 of
the Competition Act prohibits the Competition Bureau from disclosing information gathered using compulsory process (e.g. through a search warrant
or section 11 order) other than to a Canadian law enforcement agency or "for
the purposes of the administration or enforcement of "the Competition Act.5
Voluntarily supplied information, for example, by a person seeking immunity
or a settlement of Competition Bureau investigation, is not protected by section 29, although the Competition Bureau's current practice is to 52treat all
voluntarily supplied information as if it were protected by section 29
A very significant issue is whether the information protected by section
29 may be provided under the MLAT to U.S. and other authorities. A past
Director has stated that, in his view, the phrase "administration or enforcement" of the Competition Act permits disclosure to a foreign agency where

Antitrust Division Breaks Price Fixing Conspiracy in Disposable Plastic Dinnerware
Industry, U.S. Dep't of Justice, News Release, June 9, 1994.
49 Antitrust Division Breaks International Price Fixing Conspiracy in
Fax Paper
Industry, U.S. Dep't of Justice, News Release, July 14, 1994.
50 Canada Pipe Company Ltd. Pleads Guilty and Pays Record
$2.5 Million Fine For
ConspiracyOffence Under the CompetitionAct, Bureau of Competition Policy, News Release,

Sept. 27, 1995.
SI
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See Competition Act, supra note 9, at s.29(1).

Communication of Confidential Information Under the Competition Act, Bureau of

Competition Policy, Industry Canada (May 1995), at 2.
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the communication is for the purpose of receiving the assistanceS53
or cooperation of the foreign agency in respect of the Canadian investigation.
The National Competition Law Section of the Canadian Bar Association
has indicated it disagrees wih the Director's interpretation of section 29 and
that amendments are necessara to give the Director power to engage in international information sharing. The disagreement over whether the law permits the Director to share information with a foreign authority created a
highly undesirable degree of uncertainty. Thus, in June 1995, Industry Canada issued a Discussion Paper respecting proposed amendments to the Competition Act which, among other things, would have clarified
S55 the Director's
authority to engage in international enforcement cooperation.
Given the complexity of the issues in this area, the Director formed a
Consultative Panel to consider and make recommendations for amendments
to the Act. The Panel's Report recognized that there may be circumstances
where providing notice to a firm under scrutiny could prejudice an ongoing
investigation. For that reason, the Panel considered a proposal providing for
notice and possible judicial review of information sharing after the risk of
harm to an investigation had passed. The Panel's report states that it was
unable to reach a consensus in this regard.56 As a result of pending litigation
on related issues, the amendments respecting confidentiality and information
sharing were postponed.
B. Computer Searches
Another particular issue of concern to businesses in today's information
age which is now being discussed in Canada and elsewhere is the extent to
which the Competition Act authorizes the Competition Bureau to use a Canadian firm's computer system to access records located in the databases of
foreign affiliates. This includes the practical problem of how to decide where
information is located for purposes of determining whether the law is being
applied extraterritorially.

53 Id. at 3.
54 Commentary on the Draft Information Bulletin of the Director of Investigation
and

Research Respecting Confidentialityof Information Underthe Competition Act (Dec., 1994).
55 Competition Act Amendments, Bureau of Competition Policy, Discussion
Paper, June,
1995.

56 Report of the Consultative Panel on Amendments
to the Competition Act, Mar. 6,
1996. Note that in its Statement on International CooperationBetween Antitrust Authorities,
the ICC expressed the view that a firm should receive prior notification of any proposed
information exchange. See International Chamber of Commerce, Commission on Law and
Practices Relating to Competition, Statement on InternationalCooperation Between Antitrust
Authorities, Doc. No. 225/450, Rev. 3, Mar. 28, 1996.

Witterick-EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF U.S. LAW (Can.)

It is not clear whether access by an antitrust authority to computer records
located in a foreign jurisdiction constitutes an infringement of national sovereignty or a breach of national privacy laws. A further question arises
whether the notification provisions in the MLAT or 1995 Agreement would
require the Competition Bureau to notify the U.S.5 7 Department of Justice
when accessing records located in the United States.
The broadest position is that any record accessible through a computer
terminal located in the authority's jurisdiction and capable of being worked
on and copied in that jurisdiction is "located" in the authority's jurisdiction
and within its reach, regardless of where the document originated or is
stored. The narrow argument is that only those documents which are stored
on the computer system located in the authority's jurisdiction are legitimately
accessible to such authority.5 8 It also remains to be determined the extent to
which a Canadian firm (or its foreign affiliate) could sever the link between
them during the course of a search in Canada to prevent access by authorities
Canada. 9 The issues in this area are largely untested before the courts. In
that context, and given their complexity and importance, the Canadian Bar
Association has established a computer records task force to consider these
issues, in consultation with members of the Bureau and the Canadian Department of Justice. Members of the Antitrust Section of the American Bar
Association are monitoring the progress of the task force. In addition, the
International Chamber of Commerce has created a working group to study
and develop
recommendations respecting these issues in an international
6
context. 0
VII. CONCLUSION

The globalization of commerce requires that antitrust authorities consider
the effects of conduct in their jurisdiction regardless of where the conduct
It is arguable, for example, that notice may be required under the 1995 Agreement
which provides that each Party shall notify the other Party with respect to its enforcement
activities that may affect important interests of the other Party, including those that involve the
seeking of information located in the territory of the other Party, whether by personal visit by
officials of a Party to the territory of the other Party or otherwise. Article I.
58 The implication of this position is that conceivably an entity could avoid possible
detection and prosecution in a given jurisdiction by locating all its records in another
jurisdiction which does not have or does not enforce competition laws, or which is not willing
to cooperate with foreign interests in an investigation, i.e. a "Cayman Islands" for computer
records.
57

59 See C.S. Goldman, Q.C., et al. Cross-BorderComputer Searches: A Computer in Your

CanadianOffice Can Expose Files at Home, Paper presented at the Grocery Manufacturers of

America 1997 Annual Legal Conference, Washington, D.C., Oct. 1997.
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occurred. The developments reviewed above suggest that the Director is prepared to adopt some form of an effects test as the basis for the extraterritorial
application of the Competition Act. However, this approach has not been
tested in the courts or before the Competition Tribunal, and it remains to be
seen 61whether the Director's position will be supported. In particular, in Libman and related cases where the Court adopted a modified effects test,
there was some activity constituting an essential element of the offence
which took place in Canada. It remains to be seen how a court will deal with
a situation where all elements take place outside Canada.
In the meantime, continued close cooperation between the Canadian and
U.S. authorities and the potential broad access to information through computer searches means that companies doing business on both sides of the
border must ensure, now more than ever, that their conduct complies with the
antitrust laws of both countries. It is particularly important to understand the
current enforcement practices of both Canada and the United States given the
uncertainty in the Canadian law regarding the authority of the Director to
exchange information with foreign agencies.
VIII. GOING FORWARD
In addressing the issues raised by increasing cooperation, it is important
to balance public policy objectives against ensuring adequate protection for
confidential business information. In responding to this challenge, the Canada-U.S. experience is a model which can be used to assess the benefits of
and issues raised by increasing cooperation among antitrust authorities and
convergence in enforcement policy, if not laws. This experience can then be
used as a foundation for going forward on a broader scale, and perhaps, ultimately, at a multilateral level.
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